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ANTITRUST
OVERVIEW

There were few cases considered by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
in the area of antitrust during the past year. The court considered only three
cases, all of which applied pre-existing law. The issues considered in the
three cases decided were jurisdiction under the Sherman Act, group boycotts
and per se violations under the antitrust laws, and the applicability of the
antitrust laws to labor unions and collective bargaining agreements. These
issues will be discussed in a brief synopsis of the cases.
I.

JURISDICTION UNDER THE SHERMAN

ACT

In Crane v.Intermountat'n Health Care, Inc. I the court considered the issue

of subject matter jurisdiction under section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Crane
case involved a complaint by Dr. Crane alleging that the defendant, owner
and operator of Cottonwood Hospital in Murray, Utah, conspired with
others to limit competition, restrain trade, and fix prices in the practice of
pathology. More specifically, the complaint alleged that: 1) the hospital
refused to consult with Dr. Crane or to permit members of Cottonwood's
medical staff to consult with him; 2) the hospital required that all pathology
specimens of Cottonwood patients be evaluated at Cottonwood's pathology
laboratory; and 3) the hospital refused to permit Dr. Crane to use either the
hospital or his own laboratory to evaluate specimens from patients of Cottonwood's physician staff members. 2 The district court, before allowing Dr.
Crane the opportunity for discovery, dismissed the complaint for lack of
Sherman Act subject matter jurisdiction. 3 The district court based its holding on the 1975 decision in Wolf v. Jane Phillips Episcopal-MemorialMedical

Center,4 in which the Tenth Circuit held that, in order to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of section 1 of the Sherman Act, one must show a nexus
between the defendant's alleged violative conduct and interstate commerce.
A three judge panel affirmed the district court's decision in Crane.5 On
the same day the panel decision was handed down, the United States
Supreme Court decided McLain v. Real Estate Board.6 The Tenth Circuit

granted a rehearing en banc 7 to review the panel's decision in light of McLain.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes illegal "every contract, combination

. .

.

,

or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the sev-

1. 637 F.2d 715, 719 (10th Cir. 1980) (on rehearing).
2. Id. at 719-20.
3. Id. at 720.
4. 513 F.2d 684 (10th Cir. 1975).
5. 637 F.2d 715 (10th Cir. 1980). For a more complete discussion of the three judge panel

decision, see Antitrust,
Seventh Annmal Tenth Cirewl Srwvq, 58 DEN. LJ.249, 273 (1981) (hereinafter cited as Swve
6. 444 U.S. 232 (1980). For a complete discussion of the facts in McLatn, see Swrvey, supra
note 5, at 273.
7. No. 78-1346 (10th Cir. Sept. 16, 1980).
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eral states.
...8 As so aptly put by Judge Seymour, writing for the court
on rehearing, "[i]t is now hornbook law that to satisfy interstate commerce
jurisdiction under the Sherman Act the challenged activity must occur in the
flow of interstate commerce, or, though occurring on a purely local level,
substantially affect interstate commerce." 9 The court reviewed many previous United States Supreme Court cases and concluded that "for jurisdictional purposes a plaintiff must point to the relevant channels of interstate
commerce logically affected by the defendant's allegedly unlawful
conduct."' 0
Dr. Crane argued that McLain overruled the previous Supreme Court
decisions and held that the plaintiff needed only to allege that the defendant's overall business has some "substantial general effect on interstate commerce" in order to meet the jurisdictional requirement of the Sherman
Act.I 1 The court refused to accept Dr. Crane's argument and interpreted
McLain as requiring a plaintiff to establish two things in order to meet the
Sherman Act jurisdictional requirements. 12 First, the plaintiff must identify
a relevant aspect of interstate commerce. Second, the plaintiff must establish a specific relationship between the aspect of interstate commerce and the
defendant's alleged unlawful activities. Therefore, the court stated, "[i]n
sum, we do not believe McLain signals a shift in analytical focus away from
the challenged activity and towards the defendant's general or overall
business."13

Although the court of appeals held that McLain did not overrule the
previous Supreme Court decisions and the Tenth Circuit decision in Wof,
4
the court did hold that dismissal of Dr. Crane's complaint was premature.'
Citing McLain, the court reversed, stating that dismissal of a complaint
should not occur prior to giving the plaintiff ample opportunity for discovery
"unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."' 5 Applying this
standard to Dr. Crane's complaint, the court held that it could not be said
beyond doubt that Dr. Crane could prove no set of facts to show the re16
quired effect on interstate commerce.
Judge Holloway, dissenting, agreed with the majority's conclusion that
dismissal was improper, but disagreed with the majority's interpretation of
McLain. He agreed with Dr. Crane that McLain established that "an antitrust plaintiff simply need not make a particularized showing of an effect on
interstate commerce caused by the alleged conspiracy or other illegal acts,", 7
but instead, need show only that the plaintiff's activities had some general
effect on interstate commerce in order to satisfy the threshold standard for
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
637 F.2d at 720.
Id.at 722.
Id.
Id. at 723.
Id. at 724.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 727 (Holloway, J., dissenting in part).
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jurisdiction under section 1 of the Sherman Act.' 8
Other circuits that have interpreted McLazn have adopted the view of
the Crane dissent. For example, the Seventh' 9 and Ninth 20 Circuits have
held that a plaintiff need only establish a nexus between his activities and
interstate commerce, and need not establish a more specific nexus between
the defendant's alleged unlawful activities and interstate commerce. On the
other hand, the First 2 ' and Fifth 22 Circuits, when faced with the interpretation of McLain, have not found it necessary to resolve the issue. Thus, the
issue of jurisdiction under the Sherman Act is still unresolved. What is
needed is a specific mandate from the Supreme Court as to the precise requirements of subject matter jurisdiction under the Sherman Act.
II.

GROUP BOYCOTTS AND PER SE VIOLATIONS UNDER
THE ANTITRUST LAWS

In an unpublished decision, the Tenth Circuit followed the trend of
avoiding the use and recognition of per se rules under the antitrust laws.
Consolidated Farmers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Anchor Savings Association23 involved
a suit instituted by the plaintiff insurance companies against the defendant
home mortgage lenders and mortgage purchasers. The complaint charged
that the defendants willfully conspired to boycott the plaintiffs' insurance
businesses. In 1974, defendant Federal National Mortgage Association
(FNMA) promulgated certain regulations providing that it would purchase
home mortgages only if the property subject to the mortgage had insurance
coverage written by an insurance company having a "Best's VI" or a "Class
VI" rating. In the same year, the defendant home mortgage lenders adopted
a policy of granting loans solely on properties covered by insurance policies
24
written by insurance companies with a "Class VI" rating.
The rating system was established by the A.M. Best Company in its
Best's InsuranceReport. The A.M. Best Company is the only major specialized
insurance reporting and rating service in the United States. The "Class VI"
rating was assigned to insurance companies having a net worth of at least
$1,500,000.25
18. Id.
19. See Williams v. St. Joseph Hosp., 629 F.2d 448 (7th Cir. 1980).
20. See Western Waste Serv. Sys. v. Universal Waste Control, 616 F.2d 1094, 1097 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 205 (1980), in which the majority stated: "Under McLain it is
unnecessary to establish that the alleged antitrust violations substantially affected interstate
commerce ..
" The dissent, agreeing with the majority's interpretation of McLain, stated:
The McLazn Court did away with the notion that a plaintiff must prove a substantial
nexus between a defendant'r untawfld conulct and interstate commerce in order to establish subject matter jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. § 1; instead, to establish the jurisdictional element of a Sherman Act violation, a plaintiff need only demonstrate a
subrtantia nexwr between ptataz.§'s busrmas actilies and interstate commerce.
Id. at 1101 (emphasis in original). See alto Bain v. Henderson, 621 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1980);
Program Eng'r., Inc. v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 634 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980).
21. See Corey v. Look, 641 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1980).
22. See Alabama Homeowners, Inc. v. Findahome Corp., 640 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1980).
23. No. 79-2260 (10th Cir. July 24, 1980) (not for routine publication).
24. Id., slip op. at 1-2.
25. Id., slip op. at 2.
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The plaintiffs alleged that the policies established by the defendants
constituted a group boycott which isperse illegal under the Sherman Act. In
the alternative, they argued that if the boycott was notperse illegal, it constituted a violation of the Sherman Act under the "rule of reason." The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment holding
and, even
that the evidence showed no conspiracy among the defendants
26
assuming a conspiracy existed, there was no restraint of trade.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision based upon
three findings. First, the Tenth Circuit stated that the "[a]ppellants failed to
respond to appellees' affidavits 'with specific facts showing the existence of a
genuine issue for trial.' "27 Second, the court, citing Continental T V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc. and its progeny, 28 stated that the establishment of a per se
rule of illegality is appropriate only where it relates to "conduct that is manifestly anticompetitive." 29 Following this standard, the court held that the
plaintiffs did not show that the "Class VI" rating was manifestly anticompetitive. Finally, the court held that it was reasonable for FNMA to establish
such a policy because "it would be impractical for FNMA to attempt to
examine the position of the carrier in each mortgage it considered purchasing. . . . -3 Since it was reasonable for FNMA :to establish such a policy,
the court implicitly concluded that it was also reasonable for the home mortgage lenders to establish such a policy because FNMA was a major purchaser of mortgages in the United States, with purchases in 1978 of
approximately 311,000 home mortgages with unpaid balances of over $12

billion. 12
III.

APPLICABILITY OF ANTITRUST LAWS TO LABOR UNIONS AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

In Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 7,32 the Tenth Circuit followed the
established precedent that collective bargaining agreements between unions
and management are not automatically exempt from the antitrust laws.
The decision primarily involved the court's interpretation of sections 8(b)
33
and 8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act (N.L.R.A.) and only briefly
discussed the antitrust aspect of the case.
The case involved suits by Frito-Lay, Inc. and L'Eggs Products, Inc.
against the Retail Clerks Union Local No. 7 alleging that a collective bargaining agreement between Local No. 7 and the Denver Retail Grocers violated sections 8(b) and 8(e) of the N.L.R.A. and section 1 of the Sherman
Act. 34 A provision in the collective bargaining agreement prohibited em26. Id., slip op. at 1.
27. Id., slip op. at 2 (quoting Stevens v. Barnard, 512 F.2d 876, 878 (10th Cir. 1975) (emphasis in original)).
28. 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977). Seegenerally Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 7-10
(1979); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Gough v. Rossmoor
Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 387 (9th Cir. 1978), ceri. denid, 440 U.S. 936 (1979).
29. No. 79-2260, slip op. at 2 (quoting Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433

U.S. at
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

50).
No. 79-2260, slip op. at 3.
Id.
629 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1980).
29 U.S.C. § 158(b), (e) (1976).
629 F.2d at 656.
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ployees of suppliers, including salesmen employed by Frito-Lay, Inc. and
L'Eggs Products, Inc., from entering retail grocery stores to stock their merchandise. The provision specifically exempted employees of bakery and
dairy companies, most of whom were represented by the Teamsters Union,
from its operation. This exemption from the provision was negotiated pursuant to a separate agreement between Local No. 7 and the Teamsters
Union. 35 In separate lower court proceedings, the district court granted
36
summary judgment for Local No. 7 against both Frito-Lay and L'Eggs.
Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the N.L.R.A. prohibits unions from forcing one
employer to "cease using, selling, handling, transporting or otherwise dealing
in the products of"3 7 another. Section 8(e) proscribes collective bargaining
agreements whereby the employer ceases "handling, using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer ..
-38 Section 8(b)(4)(A) prohibits unions from engaging in
activities designed to force employers to enter into agreements prohibited
39
under section 8(e).
The district court held in both cases that the agreement between Local
No. 7 and the Teamsters Union and the collective bargaining agreement
between Local No. 7 and the Denver Retail Grocers were both exempt from
the antitrust laws. The Tenth Circuit pointed out that although "lawful
primary activity by unions acting in their own self interests generally may
not provide the basis of antitrust liability," the district court holding was
based on a premature finding that the provision constituted a valid primary
work preservation agreement. 4° The Tenth Circuit therefore reversed the
grants of summary judgment and remanded the cases for further findings in
accordance with the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of sections 8(b) and 8(e).
The court instructed the district court that, should it find the contract provisions violative of sections 8(b) and 8(e), it should explore the possible anti41
trust liability of Local No. 7 .
This holding squarely follows the United States Supreme Court deci43
sion in United Mine Workers of America v. Penningon,42 and similar cases,
which established that collective bargaining agreements which are not in the
interest of regulating management's labor relations with unions and which
impose anticompetitive restrictions upon others are subject to scrutiny under
the antitrust laws.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37.

29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976).

38. Id. § 158(e).
39. Id. § 158(b)(4)(A).
40. 629 F.2d at 663.
41. Id. at 663, 665.
42. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
43. See also Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea Co.,
381 U.S. 676 (1965); Kold Kist, Inc. v. Meat Cutters Local 421, 99 Cal. App. 2d 191, 221 P.2d
724 (1950).
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CONCLUSION

In the few antitrust cases decided by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals during the last year, the court simply applied pre-existing precedent to
new fact situations. The issue ofjurisdiction under the Sherman Act is one
of the few issues in the forefront of antitrust law at this time. The Tenth
Circuit was presented with the dilemma of whether to interpret an unclear
United States Supreme Court decision in accord with pre-existing precedent
or to follow the lead of the Seventh and Ninth Circuits. The Tenth Circuit
opted to follow pre-existing precedent and await a clear resolution by the
Supreme Court of what is required to meet the threshold jurisdictional requirement under the Sherman Act. The Tenth Circuit may be criticized for
not following the innovative lead of its sister circuits, but this Pandora's box
is best, at this time, left unopened.
Charles Feder

